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FROM CONTRIBUTION TO GOOD FAITH
SETTLEMENTS: EQUITY WHERE ARE YOU?
BY LARRY S. KAPLAN*
T HE RIGHT OF contribution is a remedy provided by the
law to a defendant which is compelled to pay more than
its fair share of a judgment to a plaintiff.' Its existence is
necessitated by the concept of joint and several liability,
which allows a plaintiff to collect any part of its judgment, or
all of it, against any defendant which is found liable at trial,
regardless of that defendant's share of fault.' There is pres-
ently a lack of uniformity among state contribution laws, a
variance which creates confusion in lawsuits where the appli-
cation of more than one state's law is a possibility. Nowhere
is this confusion more apparent than in aviation litigation,
which, due to the nature of flight itself, almost always in-
volves occurrences and parties with multiple state involve-
ments and connections.
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alike can be greatly affected by the applicable law of contri-
bution. It will be the purpose of this paper to examine the
inconsistencies inherent in our present contribution laws and
to analyze the various legal devices which have been created
in an attempt to insure equitable apportionment of damages
among defendants. The paper will pay special attention to
the duty, which has been recognized in a number of states, of
one defendant to another to settle in good faith, a duty which
is fast becoming the last bastion in the judicial arsenal to in-
sure equitable apportionment of damages. Hopefully, this
discussion will provide aviation insurers, adjusters and attor-
neys with a useful tool for understanding the maze of contri-
bution laws, and their progeny, so that litigation decisions
can be made in the best interests of all affected parties.
I. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
If the law is supposed to mirror man's concept of fairness,
perhaps no law is more at odds with this concept than the law
of joint and several liability. What man on the street would
accept as "just" a rule which can allow one party to be com-
pelled to pay more than its fair share of plaintiff's damages,
while allowing a more blameworthy party to go scot free?
Joint and several liability reflects the higher priority which
the law places on the principle that a plaintiff should be
made whole for its damages than it does on the principle that
damages should be apportioned equitably.4 This principle of
making the plaintiff whole, even at the expense of a defend-
ant compelled to pay more than its fair share of the loss, is
:1 Joint and several liability is justified by the argument that theoretically, a defend-
ant who is found liable, regardless of its percentage share of fault, is proximately re-
sponsible for all of plaintiff's injuries. See generaly Fleming, Report to theJont Committee
of the Califormia Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcy-
cle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (1979).
- Without joint and several liability, a plaintiff might not be able to collect all of its
judgment if one of the defendants found liable cannot pay its rightful share due to
insolvency or low insurance policy limits. Joint and several liability allows the plaintiff
to collect all of its judgment, and thus, be made "whole," as long as any of the defend-
ants has sufficient assets to satisfy that portion of the judgment which cannot be col-
lected due to the insolvency of another party.
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currently the law in the vast majority of states.' An example
will help to explain the force and effect of joint and several
liability. Let us assume that we have a plaintiff, P, who ob-
tains a $1 million verdict against defendants A, B and C. The
jury has apportioned the respective liability of the defendants
as follows: A - 10%, B - 45%, C - 45%. In a state which has
joint and several liability, P can collect the full $1 million
judgment against A, even though A's fair share of the verdict
is only $100,000.
In joint and several liability states which do not specifically
allocate a percentage of fault among defendants, the results
are just as unnatural.6 In such states, a verdict in the above
example would simply find A, B and C negligent for plain-
tiff's injuries without a specific percentage allocation of negli-
gence as to any of the defendants. Each defendant would be
liable for an equal share, in this instance, one-third, but
again, P can choose to select the entire $1 million from A
rather than the $333,333.33 to which A should rightfully be
subjected.
In a joint and several liability jurisdiction, the deep pocket
defendant cannot hope for a reasonable settlement where one
or more of the other defendants is without assets or has low
policy limits. In such cases, the plaintiff must keep the mon-
r' Only three states clearly prohibit joint and several liability: Kansas, New Hamp-
shire and Vermont. In Kansas, see Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867, 875
(1978); in New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAr. ANN. § 507:7-(a); in Vermont, see
Howard v. Spafford, 321 A.2d 74 (1974). In Kentucky, the question of whether joint
and several liability will apply is up to the jury. If the jury apportions negligence
among two or more defendants by percentage, liability is considered several. If the
jury does not make a percentage allocation, the court speculates that the jury intended
the liability to be joint. Ohio River Pipeline Corp. v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979).
,; Some states do not allocate a specific percentage of fault, but merely find all de-
fendants who are negligent equally liable. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofing
and Metal Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316 (Miss. 1977). Some other states apportion fault
according to percentage. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02(1) (West 1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2) (1983); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon
Supp. 1984); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans. Corp., 56 Wisc. 2d 383, 202
N.W.2d 268 (1972). In Utah, only where there is disproportionate fault between two
or more defendants is the jury to allocate negligence by a percentage; otherwise, a
Utah jury will find each negligent defendant equally liable. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
27-40(2) (1953).
19841
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ied defendant in the action if it wants to be assured of collect-
ing its total jury award. In our above example, assume that B
and C each have $100,000 policy limits and that A has a $5
million limit. Assume also, that the above-cited percentages
of negligence (A - 10%, B - 45%, C - 45%) and damages ($1
million) are easily discernible prior to trial. In a state which
has joint and several liability, P is not likely to accept a
$100,000 settlement offer from A, even though the offer is rea-
sonable given A's complicity in the accident. P knows that at
trial, the most it can collect from B and C is a total of
$200,000. P also knows that, assuming it obtains a liability
finding against all three defendants, it can collect from A
whatever it cannot collect from B and C. Thus, unless A is
willing to offer $800,000 in settlement, eight times its true ex-
posure, P is not likely to settle with A, and at trial, A can
expect to pick up the lion's share of the judgment despite its
minimal share of fault.
II. ENTER THE RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
As mentioned earlier, where there is no joint and several
liability, there is no need for a right of contribution.7 Contri-
bution is the method by which one defendant can recover
from another defendant that portion of plaintiffs damages
which the former defendant paid, but which the latter de-
fendant should have paid.8 In our example above, if P col-
lects $800,000 from A, $100,000 from B and $100,000 from C,
I Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867, 875 (1978). Only a few states allow
joint and several liability but do not recognize a right of contribution, See, e.g., Consol-
idated Pipe & Supply Co. v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 365 So. 2d 968, 970 (Ala.
1978); Holmes v. Hoemako Hospital, 117 Ariz. 403, 573 P.2d 477, 479 (1977); Fox v.
Fox, 168 Conn. 592, 262 A.2d 854 (1975); Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d
897 (1937), aj'd, Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E.2d 964 (Ind. App. 1979); Horton v. United
States, 622 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1980) (South Carolina).
" The right of indemnity is to be distinguished from the right of contribution. The
right of indemnity traces itself to a pre-tort relationship between defendants, such as
that between a general contractor and a sub-contractor, or between a retailer and
manufacturer, where the former party in both examples can be held technically liable
for the latter's negligence. In that situation, allowing the plaintiff to obtain and collect
its entire judgment from the technically liable party is justified by the fact that the
technically liable party, in entering into its pre-tort relationship, accepts a duty to the
plaintiff to be liable for the acts of the other party. There, indemnity is the means by
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the right of contribution would provide A with a remedy to
recover $350,000 from B and $350,000 from C, resulting in a
net payout by each defendant consistent with the jury's allo-
cation of fault. Obviously, if the subject state did not have
joint and several liability, there would be no need for this
right of contribution since P could not have collected more
than $100,000 from A to begin with.
The most glaring deficiency with the contribution remedy
is that it provides no cure to the A's of the world, where B
and C have low policy limits and few assets. In those circum-
stances, P will collect the vast majority of the judgment from
A, and A's right of contribution against B and C is rendered
valueless due to the financial status of B and C. As stressed
earlier, A's predicament here is the result of a judicial system
which places a higher priority on making the plaintiff whole
than it does on equitably apportioning damages (quite a par-
adox given the fact that only a few years ago, a number of
jurisdictions would not allow a plaintiff to recover any por-
tion of its damages if it was found to be at all contributorily
negligent).
But what about those situations where B and C have assets
or big policy limits and P nevertheless asserts all or most of its
collection rights against A? This can occur when collection,
for whatever reason, can be accomplished easier from A, or
where P is friendlier with B and C and therefore looks to A
for its compensation. The potential for this situation is en-
hanced by the "heat of battle" nature of trials, and if P is
angered by A's conduct at trial, P might well go after A for
more than A's fair share of the verdict amount. But how is A
able to assert its right of contribution and what can A do to
which the technically liable party can later seek reimbursement from the culpable
party.
The right of contribution cannot be traced to a pre-tort relationship where one party
has accepted a duty to pay plaintiff for the acts of another party. In fact, the relation-
ship between parties who maintain rights of contribution against each other is not
initiated until the occurrence of the tort itself. In this situation, where one party has
been compelled to pay plaintiff for the liability of another, a liability which the "pay-
ing" party never accepted, the need to "equalize" through the right of contribution is
more compelling than the need which justifies the right of indemnity. See LeMaster v.
Amsted Indus., 110 Ill. App. 3d 729, 442 N.E.2d 1367 (1982).
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assure that it is not left "holding the bag" for another party's
fair share with respect to plaintiff's judgment amount? The
next section will deal with asserting one's right of
contribution.
III. METHOD FOR ASSERTING RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
In some jurisdictions, a cause of action for contribution
does not accrue until a joint tortfeasor pays more than its pro-
portionate share of damages.9 Additionally, the party against
whom the joint tortfeasor seeks contribution must be dis-
charged from further liability to the plaintiff before the right
of contribution will be enforceable.' ° Thus, in our above ex-
ample, A would have to wait until P collected from A an
amount in excess of A's percentage share of the judgment,
and until B's and C's further liability was discharged by a
satisfaction of the judgment, before A would have an enforce-
able right of contribution against B and C.
Many states, however, recognize an inchoate right of con-
tribution which comes into being when the underlying inci-
dent causing P's injuries occurs." In these jurisdictions, local
procedural rules must be scrutinized carefully to determine if
a joint tortfeasor sacrifices its right of contribution if a cross
claim for contribution is not timely filed prior to the trial of
P's lawsuit. A good example of the conflict in judicial deci-
sions with respect to the question of the appropriate time to
file a contribution action can be seen by looking to the law of
one state, Illinois, where appellate courts in different districts
have come up with opposite conclusions as to what the law
should be.
In Tisonczk v. Szczepankiewica,12 the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District ruled that a contribution claim must be
!I Coulson v. Larsen, 94 Wis. 2d 56, 287 N.W.2d 754 (1980); Bishop v. Klein, 380
Mass. 285, 402 N.E.2d 1365 (1980); Hart v. Cessna Aircraft, 276 N.W.2d 166 (Minn.
1979); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Mumert, 212 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1973).
Sochenski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
For examples of state laws which recognize an inchoate right, see OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12 § 832(a) (West Supp. 1983-84): OR. REv. STAT. § 18.440(1) (1981); and
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN., § 600.2925(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983-84).
12 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 446 N.E.2d 1271 (1983).
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asserted by counter-claim or third-party claim in the plain-
tiff's action or the right of contribution between defendants
will be lost. There, one defendant was voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiff during trial, and the remaining defendant ob-
jected because this dismissal would effect the remaining de-
fendant's right of contribution against the dismissed
defendant. The court held that the remaining defendant did
not have standing to object because by not asserting its right
of contribution before the trial, it lost its right and thus had
nothing to lose by the dismissal of the other defendant.
In Laeu v. Leijhei't,13 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Sec-
ond District held that a contribution action may be filed by
one defendant against another defendant after judgment has
been entered by the court in the underlying plaintiff's law-
suit. A category of cases not mentioned above involves situ-
ations where A might seek contribution against N, a non-
party in P's lawsuit.14 This paper does not address itself spe-
cifically to that scenario because there, A's equitable right to
a fair apportionment of damages among defendants is not
threatened since N is not a defendant and thus joint and sev-
eral liability cannot be used by P to collect N's share from A.
It is, however, important to note that while some jurisdic-
tions 5 will not recognize A's right of contribution against N
until after A has paid P, thereby extinguishing N's liability,
other jurisdictions might16 require A to file a third party com-
plaint against N in P's lawsuit or risk losing the right of con-
tribution against N after a verdict has been rendered in P's
case. 17
No. 830192, slip opinion (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 29, 1983).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2952a(5) (West Supp. 1983-84) (requiring that a
settling defendant make a reasonable effort to notify any non-party against whom it
intends to seek contribution of the pending lawsuit in order to maintain its right of
contribution against the non-party). The purpose of this rule is apparently to provide
the non-party an opportunity to participate in the settlement.
See supra notes 9-10.
See Tisoncik, 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 446 N.E.2d 1271 (1983).
See MICH. COMP. LAW. ANN. § 600.2925a(7) (West Supp. 1983-84), for the rule
that a party cannot obtain contribution against a non-party after satisfying part or all
of a judgment unless a reasonable offer was made to notify the non-party of the action.
1984]
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IV. EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT ON RIGHTS OF
CONTRIBUTION
No one event creates a wider variety of response within the
framework of state contribution laws than when one joint
tortfeasor settles prior to the time that a judgment is entered.
Questions arise with respect to the effect of the settlement on
the contribution rights of the settling joint tortfeasor as well
as the effect of the settlement on the contribution rights of the
non-settling joint tortfeasor. This next section will address
these effects and discuss strategies which the plaintiff, settling
defendant and non-settling defendant might utilize given
their respective positions in the settlement.
A. Effect on Setthng Joiht Tor6feasor
In almost every jurisdiction, a settling joint tortfeasor will
lose its right of contribution against the non-settling joint
tortfeasors if the settlement does not extinguish the non-set-
tlors from further liability to the plaintiff."8 In our example,
if A settles with P for $500,000 and the release does not also
release B and C, the settlement extinguishes A's rights of con-
tribution against B and C. The extinguishment of A's right
of contribution in this circumstance is not particularly troub-
lesome. A is free to settle with P or to stay in the litigation
until a judgment is rendered. A has control over its own
destiny and since its voluntary decision to settle knowingly
cuts off its rights of contribution against B and C, the extin-
'" The following state statutes require that a settling joint tortfeasor, through the
release provided by the plaintiff, extinguish the further liability to plaintiff of any
party against whom it seeks contribution: ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(d) (1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2003(3) (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5102(4) (West Supp.
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302(c) (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(20)(3)
(West Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-23 (West Supp. 1983-84); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-803(2) (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 302(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 50 § 17 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925(a)(3)(a)-(d)
(West Supp. 1983-84); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.115(3) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-
2(c) (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-l(d) (1983); N.D. CEN. CODE § 32-38-01(4) (1960);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(b) (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 832(d)
(West Supp. 1983-84); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8324(c) (Purdon 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.440(3) (1981); S.D. COM. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-14 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 29-11-102(d) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (1953); and, VA. CODE
§ 301.25.1(B) (1983).
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guishment of the right does not create any inequities. A is
not compelled to settle for an amount over what it believes its
exposure to be, and it thus does not have an equitable need
for contribution from B or C.
As mentioned above, however, if A's settlement with P ex-
tinguishes the further liability of B or C, A is able to maintain
a contribution action against B and C.' 9 Thus, if in consider-
ation of A's settlement with P for $500,000, A required P to
enter into a general release, or an agreement which specifi-
cally released B and C from further liability, A would be free
to file a contribution action against B or C in an attempt to
prove that some portion of A's settlement with P should have
been paid by B or C, given their share of culpability. This
strategy might be appropriate where A doubts P's willingness
or ability to prove a case against B or C and A believes it
could be more successful going against B or C directly with-
out P remaining in the lawsuit. In such a circumstance, A
will be best advised to settle with P for the entire amount of
P's damages, obtaining a release, and to rely on a contribu-
tion action against B and C after settlement to seek an equi-
table apportionment of damages for B and C.
An example of a case where a joint tortfeasor would havebenefited by this strategy is Cardo Systems, Inc. v. Superir
Court.2" There plaintiff sued a hospital and the distributor of
a heart lung machine for the death of the plaintiff-decedent.
After suit was filed, plaintiff dismissed the distributor in ex-
change for the distributor's agreement not to pursue costs
against the plaintiff. The court interpreted this agreement as
a settlement since the settling defendant arguably "paid" the
amount of its costs which it may have recovered. This settle-
ment in turn was held to bar the hospital's right of contribu-
tion against the distributor of the heart lung machine. It was
clear from the pre-trial discovery that the distributor shared
liability with the hosptial for the death of plaintiffs decedent
but was dismissed because plaintiff believed the strict liability
case necessary to prove the distributor's liability might con-
For supporting cases, see supra note 18.
o 176 Cal. Rptr. 254, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880 (1981).
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fuse the jury and that the negligence case against the hospital
would be easier to explain. Additionally, since the hospital
had'sfifficient policy limits for any likely verdict amount, as a
matter of trial tactics plaintiff believed it was in a better posi-
tion without the distributor defendant in the lawsuit. Thus,
the hospital was forced to shoulder the full liability for the
plaintiff decedent's death. Had the hospital settled first with
plaintiff for the full amount of plaintiff's damages and extin-
guished the distributor's liability via its release with the
plaintiff, the hospital would then have been able to pursue a
contribution action against the distributor and been in a far
better position than it ultimately occupied.
Suffice it to say, a party must be aware of the applicable
contribution law in making its settlement decisions. It must
know whether or not a settlement on its behalf will extinguish
its right of contribution against other joint tortfeasors before
it can decide what it should be willing to pay in settlement.
Where the language of its release with plaintiff governs
whether a contribution action might be maintained, it must
make certain that where it pays more than its fair share of
damages with the goal of seeking contribution later, its re-
lease with plaintiff extinguishes the further liability of those
parties against whom contribution will be sought. A release
containing language which discharges "any and all other per-
sons whether herein named or not" has been held to clearly
and explicitly discharge not only the signing tortfeasor, but
all persons.'
B. Effect of Settlement on Non-Settling Joint Tortfeasors
While the potential extinguishment of a settling joint
tortfeasor's right of contribution should not be a cause of con-
cern among legal purists, the exact opposite is true when we
look to the effect a settlement has on the right of contribution
of the remaining joint tortfeasors. In our prior example,
where C, who is likely to be found 45% liable for P's $1 mil-
lion in damages, settles for a nominal amount prior to trial,
2, Doganieri v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
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what happens to A's and B's rights of contribution against C?
What effect does C's settlement with P have on the eventual
judgment amount which may be collected from A or B? An
analysis of the answers to these questions will bear out the
weaknesses and the lack of uniformity in present state laws to
ensure equitable apportionment of damages.
1. Is the Right of Contribution to Remainng Joint Tortfeasors
Extinguished?
Only in a minority of jurisdictions can a non-settling joint
tortfeasor maintain its right of contribution against a settling
joint tortfeasor in all circumstances.22 In such jurisdictions,
the joint tortfeasors who remain in the litigation have the
right to argue the settling joint tortfeasor's liability to the
jury and to include the settling joint tortfeasor on the verdict
form.23 In the event that the settling joint tortfeasor's share
of damages as allocated by the jury is greater than the
amount it paid in settlement, the remaining joint tortfeasors
have a right of contribution for the difference. 24 In our exam-
ple, if P settles with C for $100,000, and the verdict is for $1
million in damages with liability apportioned as follows: A-
10%, B - 45%, C - 45%, and P collects $450,000 from B and
$450,000 from A ($1 million less the $100,000 settlement, less
the $450,000 collected from B), A will have a right of contri-
bution against the already settled joint tortfeasor, C, for
$350,000 ($450,000 less $100,000 already paid in settlement).
The vast majority of those jurisdictions which recognize a
right of contribution extinguish that right for all joint
tortfeasors against any party who has settled with the plain-
- GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-32(a) (Supp. 1981). Mississippi common law would also
seem to dictate this result. See Standard Oil Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 421 F.2d 201
(1969).
'2:1 In all circumstances where the percentage of settling tortfeasor's negligence has an
impact on the ultimate liability, tortfeasor's name will be included on the verdict form.
See Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960), discussed infra note 25, and
Clemtex, Ltd. v. Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Cir. App. - Waco 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), discussed infa note 29. In each case the percentage of the settling tortfeasor's
negligence may have served to reduce the liability of the remaining tortfeasors at trial.
24 See, e.g., supra note 22.
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tiff.25  In these circumstances, the principle that damages
should be equitably apportioned again clashes with a higher
priority legal principle, this time, the principle that settle-
ments should be encouraged, and again, equitable apportion-
ment comes out playing second fiddle.
It is easy to see why settlement would not be encouraged if
a settling defendant was still subject to the non-settling par-
ties' rights of contribution. In our above example, C would
have little motive to settle with P, even for a favorable
amount, if it knew that it was still subject to A's and B's right
of contribution. This is especially true given the fact that, at
least by not settling, C has an opportunity to defend itself at
trial. If A and B maintain their rights of contribution against
C where C has settled, C would be subject to the jury's alloca-
, ALASKA STAT. § .09.16.949(2) (1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West
1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 768.31(5)(b) (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 302(d)
(Smith-Hurd 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 231 B § 4(b) (Mitchie/Law Co-op. 1974);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245(2) (1979); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(b) (McKinney
1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04(2) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(l)(2)
(Page 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105(a)(2) (1980); VA. CODE § 8.0135.1(2)
(Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-113(a)(ii) (1983).
See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1005 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6304(b)
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-32(a) (Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-25
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 806 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50 § 20 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-3-5 (Supp. 1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8327 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 10-6-8 (1970); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-18 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-43 (1977). In each of these statutes, the settling defendant must state in its
release that the remaining defendants will have a pro rata credit for the share of the
settlor's liability in order for the settlor to be immune from contribution actions by the
non-settling defendants. In the Pennsylvania case of Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161
A.2d 150 (1960), the court had an opportunity to deal with this requirement. There,
the plaintiff sued A and B. A and B in turn filed a 3rd party complaint against C. C
had settled with P for $4,500 and had asserted its release as a bar to B's and C's third
party action for contribution. The release language stated, in part, that "should it
appear that two or more persons or entities are jointly or severally liable in tort for the
said injuries to person or damage to property resulting from or arising out of said
accident, the consideration for this release shall be received in reduction of the total
damages recoverable against all other tort-feasors to the extent of the pro-rata share of the
said /releasef' (emphasis added).
The release was held to be a bar to A's and B's action for contribution against C. At
trial, the jury returned a verdict for $110,833.17 jointly against A, B and C. The court
reduced A's and B's liability by C's one-third pro rata share, resulting in a liability to A
and B of $36,944.39 each. C was not compelled to pay any more than its $4,500.00
settlement amount. P ended up with a recovery of $78,388.78 in spite of its verdict for
$110,833.17 due to its "light" settlement with C.
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tion of damages. If A and B choose to wait until after a ver-
dict is rendered before filing their contribution action against
C, C will be in the position of having had its liability being
ascertained while not being present at trial. This predica-
ment is obviously one not to be relished by C. Before enter-
ing into settlement, C should determine the applicable law
with respect to the rights of others for contribution against it
after it settles with P. Where the right of contribution is not
extinguished, unless C pays an amount in settlement which it
is certain will cover an eventual allocation by the jury against
its own empty chair, C is not able to buy its peace through
the settlement.26 If settlement does not extinguish the rights
of others to obtain contribution against C, C risks far greater
exposure by settling and then being absent from trial, and
thus has no reason to settle.
While this paper recognizes that the principle of equitable
apportionment of damages cannot coexist with the principle
of encouraging settlements, it questions giving the latter prin-
ciple higher priority. After all, if settlement is to be en-
couraged, it is only because it ends the costs associated with
litigation. But the litigation was not initiated by the non-
settling defendants. Is it fair that they be the very parties
whose rights are extinguished in order to partially cut off a
process which they did not start! Additionally, extinguishing
the right of contribution against a settling defendant only re-
sults in piecemeal settlements; the litigation as to the remain-
ing defendants continues. What overall advantage is there
with respect to ending the ills of litigation if the lawsuit con-
tinues against non-settling defendants? And continue it will,
because as pointed out earlier, as long as there is joint and
several liability, a plaintiff would be foolish to settle with a
deep pocket defendant for a reasonable amount where it
21 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-32(a) (1981) states: "The right of joint tortfeasor to con-
tribution from others continues unabated and is not lost by compromise and settlement
of a claim of injury to person, property or wrongful death and release therefrom."
Thus, if a settling defendant pays less in settlement than the jury ascertains its liability
to be, that defendant will be liable for the difference between the settlement amount
and the amount of liability entered against it by the jury to the defendant against
whom plaintiff collects that excess amount.
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needs that deep pocket defendant on its jury verdict in order
to be able to collect from it any part or all of the judgment,
where other defendants have low policy limits or few assets.
(Remember our example of A needing to settle for $800,000,
eight times its true culpability, in order to hope to settle in a
joint and several liability jurisdiction!)
2. The Effect Of The Settlement: Pro Rata or Pro Tanto
All of the states which recognize a right of contribution
also recognize that if that right is to be extinguished as
against the settling defendant, a counter-action safeguard is
necessary to promote equitable apportionment of damages.27
The response in a minority of jurisdictions is to reduce the
plaintiff's eventual judgment by the pro rata, or percentage,
share of the settling defendant's fault.2 8 In states where this
occurs, in order to determine the settling defendant's pro rata
21 See statutes cited in/ta notes 28 and 31; each of these statutes provide some form of
credit to the non-settling defendant for the settling defendant's settlement.
- Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Cartel Capital
Corp. v. Fireco, 410 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1980); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113
(N.D. 1979); Clemtex, Ltd. v. Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ladwig v. Ermanco, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Wis. 1981). See also
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2203 (West 1952) (which has been interpreted as allowing a
pro rata reduction); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:53A-3 (1952) (permits recovery from other
joint tortfeasors for excess paid over pro rata share).
In New York, the court will reduce the plaintiff's eventual judgment by the pro rata
share of the settlor's fault if that amount is greater than the dollar amount of the
settlement. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(a) (McKinney 1978).
The following state courts will reduce the plaintiffs eventual judgment by the pro
rata share of the settlor's fault if the release between the plaintiff and the settlor so
specified: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1005 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6304(b)
(1975); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 663-15 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-806 (1979); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 50, §§ 19, 20 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-4, -5 (1978); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8326-27 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-7, -8 (1969); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-17, -18 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-42, -43 (1953).
If the release did not so specify, the non-settling defendants retain their rights of
contribution against the settlor, so that the effect on the non-settling joint tortfeasors is
an equitable one. To illustrate, in those states, if P settles with C for $100,000, with
eventual fault allocated by the jury of A - 10%, B - 45% and C - 45%, and P's damages
are $I million, if C's release specified a pro rata reduction, P's judgment, recoverable
against A and B will be reduced to $550,000. If the release did not specify pro rata
reduction, P'sjudgment would only be reduced by the $100,000 settlement. However,
A and B would retain their rights of contribution against C for $350,000 which, assum-
ing recovery from C, would result in the same net exposure of A and B to P for
$550,000, their fair joint liability.
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share, its name must be on the verdict form so that the jury
can allocate the appropriate percentage of negligence to the
settling defendant.29 In our example, if P settles with C for
$100,000 and at trial the jury verdict is for $1 million, allo-
cating the fault of A at 10%, B at 45% and the settled C at
45%, P's judgment is reduced by $450,000, which represents
C's pro rata share of P's damages (45% of $1 million). P is then
only able to collect $550,000 from A and B, and if it chooses
to collect all of that amount from A, A's right of contribution
against B would entitle A to collect reimbursement from B in
the sum of $450,000.
In jurisdictions which reduce the plaintiff's eventual judg-
ment by the pro rata share of the settling defendant's fault,3 °
the non-settling defendant's lost right of contribution as
against the settlor has been completely neutralized. In our
example above, A and B do not need a right of contribution
against C in order to insure equitable apportionment of dam-
ages because the full amount of the lost right has been de-
ducted from A's and B's eventual exposure to P.
In fact, in jurisdictions where judgments are reduced by
the pro rata share of the settling defendant's fault, the remain-
ing tortfeasors are actually in a better position than they
would be if the settlement did not eliminate their rights of
contribution. If the settlement above had not eliminated A's
and B's rights of contribution against C, and the settlement
was not reduced by C's pro rata share of fault, P could collect
$1 million from A, and although A would then have a right
of contribution against B and C for $450,000 each, if C is
insolvent or has low policy limits, A is not likely to collect a
significant portion of its rightful contribution amount against
- In Clemtex, Ltd. v. Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), the plaintiff sued four defendants, A, B, C, and D. Plaintiff settled with A
and B before trial jointly for $160,000. In plaintiff's trial against C and D, A's and B's
names were on the verdict form. The jury found A and B 0% negligent; C and D 60%
negligent; and plaintiff 40% contributorily negligent. Plaintiff's damages were
$202,326.53, which, after reducing for plaintiff's own negligence, were $121,395.92.
Plaintiff was able to recover the full $121,395.92 from C and D in spite of its settlement
with A and B, since a pro rata reduction of the judgment by A's and B's percentage
share of fault had no effect on the amount.
:11 See supra note 28.
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C. A is thus in a worse position than it would be in ajurisdic-
tion which eliminates A's right of contribution against C
upon C's settlement with P, but which also reduces P's even-
tual judgment by C's pro rata share of fault.
The majority of jurisdictions which extinguish non-settling
defendants' rights of contribution against the settling defend-
ant reduce the plaintiff's eventual judgment not by the per-
centage of the settlor's fault (pro rata reduction) but by the
dollar amount of the'settlor's settlement (pro lanto reduc-
tion)." In these jurisdictions, in our example, C's settlement
for $100,000 would result in a $100,000 reduction in P's judg-
ment of $1 million against A and B, in spite of C's 45% share
of fault. A and B would lose their right of contribution
against C as a result of C's settlement with P. If P chose to
collect the entire net balance of its judgment of $900,000
from A, A's lone right of contribution would be for $450,000
against B. Even if A could collect its rightful share of contri-
bution from B, A's net payout would be $450,000, which is
$350,000 more than its fair share of P's judgment, and A
would have no right of contribution against the defendant
who got out $350,000 light, the fortunate Mr. C.
The only party whose strategy will be affected by the ques-
tion of whether a pro lanto or pro rala reduction is in effect is
the plaintiff. The non-settling defendants A and B are obvi-
ously not in a position to make a decision with respect to
:11 Maddox v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 357 So. 2d 974 (Ala. 1978); Adams v. Dion, 509
P.2d 201 (Ariz. 1973); Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E.2d 964 (Ind. App. 1979); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.16.040(1) (1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-50.5-105(a) (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5)(a) (West 1984); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70 § 302(c) (Smith-Hurd 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 B, § 4(a)
(West 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.295(c) (West Supp. 1984); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.32(0(1) (Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.455(a) and (b) (1981);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8326 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-7 (1970); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-11.105(a)(1) (1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-35.1 (Supp. 1982); W. VA.
CODE § 55-7-12 (1981). Note that in Iowa, the court allows a pro tanto credit where to
allow a pro rata credit would give the plaintiff a windfall. In Wadle v. Jones, 312
N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1981), plaintiff sued A and B. A settled prior to trial for $45,000.00.
At trial, plaintiff obtained a judgment against A and B jointly for $45,125.95. Since
only allowing a 50% reduction of the judgment amount would have resulted in plain-
tiff collecting, as a result of its settlement and judgment, an amount far in excess of the
jury's determination of damages, the court applied a pro tanto reduction resulting in B's
exposure on the judgment being reduced to $125.95. Id.
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whether or not C's settlement offer should be made or ac-
cepted. The settling defendant, C, is unaffected after its set-
tlement by the manner in which the applicable law reduces
P's ultimate judgment against A and B. Where C's settle-
ment extinguishes A's and B's rights of contribution against
C, it does not matter to C whether P's ultimate verdict will be
reduced by C's percentage share of fault or by the amount of
C's settlement. C is subject to no further exposure in either
case.
The question of whether the applicable law reduces plain-
tiff's judgment pro rala or pro tanto will have a profound effect
on plaintiff's decision to settle. In a jurisdiction which allows
a pro ra/a reduction, plaintiffs will be ill-advised to settle with
a defendant with low policy limits, where that defendant has
a high percentage of negligence exposure. Unless a plaintiff
can collect from the settlor an amount equal to that party's
true exposure, the plaintiff risks losing the full amount of its
miscalculation. In our example, if P settles with C, even for
C's policy limits of $100,000, P will have made a mistake
which costs it $350,000 where pro rata reduction laws are ap-
plicable, for as a result of the settlement, P would lose the
right to collect C's exposure over its policy limits ($450,000
less $100,000, or $350,000) from defendants A and B, a right
it would maintain if it refused to settle with C and obtained a
joint judgment against A, B and C.
In a state which applies pro tanto reduction laws, P risks
nothing in settling with C, no matter what the settlement
amount. Assuming P is able to obtain a judgment against A
and B, P's judgment is only reduced by what it already ob-
tained from C resulting in a net balance to P of what it would
have obtained even had it not settled with C.
The question of whether a state will apply a pro tanto or pro
ra/a reduction rule should greatly influence a plaintiff's deci-
sion with respect to settlement. Although it will not affect the
decision process of settling or non-settling joint tortfeasors,
the question of whether the applicable reduction rule is pro
ra/a or pro lanto will greatly impact on the ultimate exposure
of the non-settling joint tortfeasor. Where the pro rata reduc-
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tion rule is applicable, the non-settling joint tortfeasor's lost
right of contribution against the settlor is completely neutral-
ized, and then some. Where the pro tan/o reduction rule is in
effect, however, the non-settling joint tortfeasor is the lone
victim where a plaintiff has settled with a defendant for an
amount less than that defendant's fair share of fault.
Both the pro tanto and the pro rata reduction rules contain
the inherent potential for inequity, but the inequity is visited
upon different parties depending upon which rule is in use. It
will not be able to collect its true damages if it settles with
one of two or more defendants for an amount less than the
jury eventually allocates as that defendant's fair share. In a
pro tanto state, the non-settling defendant is the party at risk.
It will have to pay more than its fair share of plaintiff's dam-
ages if plaintiff settles with a co-defendant for an amount less
than that co-defendant's true share of liability. Even though
both the pro rata and pro tanto rules are potentially inequitable,
at least in a pro rata state, the party who is at risk, the plain-
tiff, can control its own destiny by virtue of the settlement
amount it accepts. Only in a pro tanto state is the party who is
at risk, the non-settling defendant, at the complete mercy of
others, the plaintiff and the settling defendant, and in that
respect, the pro tanto rule is the one which creates the most
concern.
What remedy, if any, does the law provide to a defendant
whose equitable right to pay only its fair share of plaintiffs
damages has been obliterated by joint and several liability;
whose second line defense - the right of contribution - has
been extinguished by its joint tortfeasor's settlement; and
who, instead of receiving a fair credit for the joint tortfeasor's
share of fault against the plaintiffs ultimate judgment, only
receives a credit for the amount of the settlement, no matter
how low that settlement might have been in relation to the
settlor's true exposure?
A review of the judicial arsenal reveals that there is one
remedy which is available to the non-settling defendant when
an unfairly low settlement results in it being exposed to liabil-
ity beyond its true share. The remedy is the requirement that
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a settlement in a multi-party lawsuit be in good faith as to
the non-settling defendants. The next section will discuss this
concept and the way in which it has been applied by the
courts.
V. ENTER THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
A number of states which extinguish the non-settlor's right
of contribution against the settling tortfeasor and proceed to
compound the inequity by only allowing the non-settlor a pro
tanto reduction against the eventual judgment do impose a
good faith duty with respect to the contribution extinguish-
ing settlement. Presently, the good faith standard has been
enacted by statute in 17 states. 2 The typical statute states
that in order for the settlor to be discharged from the contri-
bution rights of joint tortfeasors, its settlement must be in
good faith. 3 The purpose of the good faith standard is to
insure that a settling defendant's settlement amount is not so
low so as to impose a potentially disproportionate cost on the
defendant ultimately selected for suit.3 4
:2 The states that have enacted good faith statutes are:
1. Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983).
2. Cal. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West 1980).
3. Colo. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (Supp. 1983).
4. Fla. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5) (West 1984).
5. I1. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 302(c) (Smith-Hurd 1983).
6. Mass. MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 231 B § 4 (Mitchie/Law Co-
op. 1974).
7. Mich. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.295(c)(a) (West
Supp. 1984).
8. Nev. NEv. REV. STAT. § 17.245 (1979).
9. N.Y. N.Y. GEN. OBLI. LAW § 15-108 (Consol. 1978).
10. N.C. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-4 (1983).
11. N.D. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1976).
12. Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(F) (Page 1981).
13. Okla. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 832(H)(1) and (2) (West
Supp. 1983-84).
14. Or. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.455(1)(a) & (b) (1981).
15. Tenn. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105(a) (1980).
16. Va. VA. CODE § 801-35.1(1) (Supp. 1982).
17. Wyo. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-113(a) (1983).
See, e.g., any of the statutes cited supra note 32.
Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (Ct.
App. 1981).
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The good faith duty becomes the last frontier in the law's
efforts to promote equitable apportionment of damages. As
such, it should be a powerful and well-delineated remedial
tool. In practice, however, it is a weak, vague standard that
has created more confusion than help where knowledge of its
presence even exists. How do the courts apply this duty on
which the law now relies as its last stop-gap device to insure
fair payment of damages? A review of the relevant case law
will illustrate the difficulty presented by the good faith
concept.
A. What Is Good Faith and Is Lack of it Actionable?
Where the duty to settle in good faith has been established
by statute, the courts have recognized that a breach of the
duty of good faith provides a cause of action for damages to a
non-settling defendant against the settlor for contribution. 5
Thus, where the settlement is not in good faith, the settle-
ment will not extinguish the non-settling parties' rights of
contribution.
In determining whether or not a breach of the duty of good
faith has occurred, the sole test should be the amount of the
settlement as it relates to the settlor's true exposure. Such a
test would be consistent with the goal of utilizing the good
faith standard to insure equitable apportionment of damages.
After all, if the purpose behind the concept is to prevent a
non-settling defendant from having to pay more than its fair
share of a judgment, it must be understood that the only way
to effect that purpose is to prevent a settling defendant from
settling for less than its fair share of liability. If the court
allows any criterion other than the amount of a settlement to
be determinative of that settlement's good faith, the court
will be straying from the goal of the concept in the first place.
It is therefore quite strange that so many courts look to fac-
tors other than the amount of the settlement to ascertain
whether a settlement has been made in good faith.
I., River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 996, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498, 505 (Ct. App. 1972).
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There are primarily two categories of judicial tests for good
faith settlements, the "collusion" test3 6 and the "unreasona-
bly cheap settlement" test.3 7
The collusion test, where utilized, dictates that a settlement
which results in an inequitable apportionment of damages
will not be set aside as lacking good faith if tortious conduct
on the part of the plaintiff or settling defendant is not pres-
ent. 38 This requirement of tortious conduct is interpreted as
necessitating proof of collusion or a motive to injure the non-
settling tortfeasor in order to find good faith lacking.39
In River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court,4 ° where plaintiffs'
attorney settled with all but one defendant and allocated the
majority of the settlement funds to the plaintiffs with the
least damages, the remaining defendant challenged the settle-
ment as lacking good faith since the allocation resulted in a
smaller pro lanto credit to be applied towards the plaintiffs
with the greatest damages. The court there stated that "any
negotiated settlement involves cooperation, but not necessar-
ily collusion. It becomes collusive when it is aimed to injure
the interest of an absent tortfeasor.
' 4 1
In Dompeing v. Superior Court,42 the court, in reviewing the
River Garden decision, stated that "[c]ollusion between settling
parties was identified in River Garden Farms, Inc. as a major
element of bad faith. '43 In Dompeling, the plaintiff was in-
jured in an auto accident when a truck driver swerved to miss
a bus which was stopped partially on the roadway. Plaintiff
settled with the truck driver, and the bus company chal-
lenged the settlement as lacking good faith. In a very dis-
turbing opinion, the California appellate court held that:
:v See Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 805, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42
(Ct. App. 1981).
:11 The term "unreasonably cheap settlement" was first used in River Garden Farms,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 1986, 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1972).
Dompehng, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
:9Id
26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
Id at 505.
117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
43 117 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
792 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
Bad faith is not established by a showing that settling defend-
ant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share of
the value of plaintiff's case. A settlement always removes the
settling defendant from the action; this necessarily results in a
possibility that the remaining defendants will suffer judgment
greater in amount than if there had been no settlement ....
[A] settling defendant does not owe a legal duty to adverse
parties, the non-settling defendants, to pay the plaintiff more
so that the adverse parties may pay plaintiff less. . . . [T]he
settling parties owe the non-settling defendants a legal duty to
refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct; absent con-
duct violative of such duty, the settling parties may act to fur-
ther their respective interests without regard to the effect of
their settlement upon other defendants.4
In Ford Motor Co. v. Schu/tz, 45 where the plaintiff in an auto
accident case settled with the driver of the car that hit him
but kept his lawsuit alive against Ford, Ford challenged the
good faith test enunciated in Dompeh'ng, and the court held
that "the rationale to be applied in any instance where the
good faith character of a settlement is challenged is one
which will find the existence of that element absent any ade-
quate showing of collusion 'aimed at injuring the interests of
the absent tortfeasor.' 46
There appear to be at least two reasons why the applica-
tion of a test which requires proof of tortious conduct or col-
lusion before a court will find a good faith settlement lacking.
First, simply looking to the price of a settlement to determine
if a settlement has been in good faith would require that a
court conduct a mini-trial on the substantive issues present in
the plaintiff's underlying tort lawsuit. After all, how else
would the court be able to determine the settlor's likely per-
centage of liability and the amount of plaintiff's damages?
No court in any jurisdiction has been willing to conduct such
a mini-trial in order to determine whether a settlement has
been in good faith.
Second, in instances where the settlor has low policy limits,
4 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
41 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470. (Ct. App. 1983).
- 147 Cal. App. 3d at 950, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
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the settlement might not fairly reflect that defendant's fair
share of culpability, while the amount, nevertheless, is to the
full extent of its assets or policy limits. Again, no court has
been willing to hold a settlement of policy limits in bad faith,
even where the policy limits were disproportionately low
given the settlor's share of fault.
In Stambaugh v. Superior Court,47 one of two defendants in the
wrongful death action prior to trial settled with the plaintiff
for $25,000, the full extent of its policy limits. The non-set-
tling defendant challenged the good faith of the settlement,
arguing that the settlement amount did not represent a fair
proportion of the settlor's exposure. The court opined that
good faith cannot be determined by the amount the settle-
ment bears to the damages of the claimant because damages
are speculative and the probability of legal liability uncer-
tain. The court also stated that, even where a plaintiffs dam-
ages are great and liability is certain, a disproportionately
low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a rela-
tively insolvent and uninsured or underinsured joint
tortfeasor. The court went on to affirm the settling defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the cross-
claim filed against it by the non-settling defendant who had
alleged a bad faith settlement.48
In Torres v. State of New York,49 a father defendant was sued
by the estates of his three children who died as a result of an
automobile accident where the father was the driver. The
father was both administrator for the children's estates and
defendant in their lawsuits. As a defendant, he paid a total of
$30,000 for the three childrens' death cases ($10,000 for each
child), which represented the per-person limits of his liability
insurance policy. A non-settling defendant counter-claimed
against the father seeking contribution, claiming that the set-
tlement was not in good faith. The court dismissed the
counter-claim, holding that the release was given in exchange
62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976).
IR d.
67 A.D.2d 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1979).
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for substantial consideration. 50
Obviously, the consideration in Torres was not substantial.
It is clear in this and the other decisions cited above that
where a joint tortfeasor offers its policy limits in settlement,
even where those limits are small with relation to that de-
fendant's fair share of fault, the settlement will not be
deemed to have been made in bad faith.
Although settlements in the amount of policy limits can be
disproportionate to the settlor's share of fault, holding such
settlements to be in good faith does not really worsen the po-
sition of the remaining tortfeasors. In these policy limit cases,
even if the settlement had not occurred, the plaintiff is not
likely, in any event, to have collected more than the policy
limits from the settlor, no matter what the amount and per-
centage of its judgment against the settlor would have been
at trial. Thus, even though the policy limits might not reflect
the settlor's fair share of plaintiffs' damages, the remaining
defendants would have been compelled to pay the coverage
whether or not the settlement had taken place, and the lost
right of contribution against the assetless settlor would have
been valueless.
In the courts' efforts to circumvent a price test as a good
faith standard in policy limits cases they have, however, for-
mulated standards which create poor precedent for those
cases where the settling defendant would be able to pay its
fair share of a judgment but nevertheless settles for far less
than that amount. These resulting judicial standards which
require proof of collusion or tortious conduct between the
plaintiff and the settling defendant in order to deem a settle-
ment to be in bad faith are inconsistent with the goals of pro-
moting equitable apportionment of damages. In almost all
instances, a disproportionately low settlement, or even an
"unreasonably cheap settlement," will be the sole result of a
defendant's having looked out for its own best interests in
settling for the best price it possibly can. Although that situa-
tion might result in a severe inequity being visited upon the
rid
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remaining defendants where the settlement is extremely dis-
proportionate to the settlor's fault, it will not be the result of
collusion or conduct on the part of the settlor with any ulte-
rior motive other than to buy its peace. If the courts are go-
ing to require proof of collusion or improper ulterior motives
before they are willing to set aside unfairly low settlements on
the grounds of bad faith, the good faith standard will be ren-
dered completely useless.
There are only two classes of cases where proof of collusion,
tortious conduct or improper ulterior motives are likely to be
present. The first class of cases involves employer-employee
or intra-familial immunity. The typical scenario here is
where a party who is immune from suit by a plaintiff but
subject to a third-party action for contribution by a defend-
ant settles with the plaintiff. The immune defendant could
not possibly have been liable to the plaintiff, and its sole rea-
son for settling is to avoid the contribution action by the re-
maining defendant. In these situations, the courts are likely
to find that the settlements are violative of the good faith
standard and that they do not extinguish the remaining de-
fendants' rights of contribution against the settlor.5"
The second class of cases in which tortious conduct is likely
to be provable is that category of cases where an attorney
represents a number of plaintiffs who are all in the same fam-
ily. This situation existed in River Garden 2 and Lareau v. South-
ern Pacfic Transp. Co.53  In both cases the same attorney
In Fuquay v. General Motors Corp., 518 F. Supp. 1065 (M. D. Fla. 1981), a hus-
band settled with his wife, in spite of inter-spousal tort-immunity, in order to avoid a
third-party suit for contribution. There in spite of the obvious superfluousness of the
settlement, the court held it to be in good faith because it was for the husband's policy
limit of $15,000.
In LeMaster v. Amsted Ind. Inc., 442 N.E.2d 1367 (1982), a defendant sought con-
tribution from the plaintiff's employer who had settled with plaintiff. Under the appli-
cable law (Ill.), the employer could not be held liable to the plaintiff because
workmen's compensation was the exclusive remedy. However, the employer could be
subject to a contribution action by third parties derivative of the employee's lawsuit.
Here, the court held the settlement in bad faith and allowed the contribution action
against the employee because the settlement was not supported by consideration since
the plaintiff could not relinquish anything to the employee in return for the settlement.
,- 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498.
r:l 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 188 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975).
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represented the injury and wrongful death cases which were
generated as a result of an accident which affected more than
one member of the same family. In such cases, the attorney.
might obtain a lump sum from one defendant in return for a
release of the various cases which the attorney represents and
the attorney will retain the right to allocate the money
amongst his clients as he sees fit. In such cases, the -plaintiffs'
attorney will have the ability to allocate most of the money
toward the cause of action with the least exposure and allo-
cate a small portion of the settlement toward the cause of
action with the greatest exposure as to the remaining defend-
ants. As a result of this type of allocation, only a small credit
will inure to the benefit of the remaining defendants in the
big exposure case where reasonableness would have dictated
allocating the vast share of the settlement to that case. The
plaintiffs' attorney's motives are obviously to obtain a big set-
tlement from the settlor without allowing for a like amount
credit in its big exposure case. In cases of this type, the courts
have recognized the potential for bad faith, even though it
would be the plaintiff, and not the settlor, who would be
guilty of a breach of a duty. 4
Other than the two classes of cases mentioned above, it is
unlikely that a non-settling defendant will be able to prove
even the most disproportionately low of settlements as being
collusive. Fortunately, there is a movement in certain en-
lightened courtrooms against the collusion requirement.
These courts look strictly to the amount of the settlement and
will find good faith lacking if the settlement amount does not
reflect the relative liability of the settling defendants.
In Owen v. United States,55 the Government settled with
plaintiff and attempted to obtain contribution for a portion
of the settlement amount from co-defendant BCI. BCI
quickly entered into a settlement with the plaintiff and then
asserted the settlement as a defense to the government's con-
tribution action.
- Lareau, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 837; River Garden, 26 Cal. App. 3d
at 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
r, 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir.1983).
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The government's claim for contribution was dismissed by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California and the government appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, BCI ar-
gued that the court should apply a test followed by the Cali-
fornia State Appellate Courts, requiring proof of tortious
conduct and collusion by the settling parties before finding its
settlement lacking in good faith. The government argued
that if the settlement amount did not reflect BCI's relative
liability, the court should find good faith lacking, even absent
tortious conduct or collusion.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the California state deci-
sions and in an uncommon showing of dissatisfaction stated:
We feel that this case presents one of those rare instances
where convincing evidence exists that the highest court of a
state will not follow the result reached by some of that state's
inferior appellate courts. It appears manifest that the unduly
restrictive Dompeh'ng test is but a temporary stop on the path
of California law.56
The court went on to hold that allowing a settlement of
this nature to pass under the California statute involved
would advance neither of the statute's goals of equity and
promotion of settlement. It is inequitable because it fails to
reflect the relative liabilities of the parties inter sese.57
Whether a party is the plaintiff, settling defendant or non-
settling defendant, it is important to be aware of the good
faith standard likely to be applied to a proposed settlement.
As was seen in Owen v. United States,5' a settlement which
would pass muster under the collusion test may fail to meet
the requirements of a test which looks only to the price of the
settlement to determine if it fairly reflects the relative liabili-
ties of the parties.
' Id at 1465.
57 Id. at 1467. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
- See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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B. How Can We Utilhze the Good Faith Concept?
Although the good faith concept has proved difficult to de-
fine and to apply, in jurisdictions where the standard is in
effect, there are certain things which plaintiffs and defend-
ants can do to insure a minimum of wasted settlement efforts.
The plaintiff and the potential settlor should immediately in-
form all other parties of the terms of the settlement agree-
ment once it is achieved.
Upon settling, the settling defendant should in turn move
to amend its response to the cross-claim for contribution, if
one had been filed, and add an affirmative defense alleging
its good faith settlement as a bar to the contribution action.
The settling defendant should then move for summary judg-
ment based upon its affirmative defense. Most courts will
give priority to the motion for summary judgment and will
stay the underlying tort action while it determines whether
there has been a settlement and if so, whether the settlement
has been in good faith. 59
During the hearing on the question of the good faith settle-
ment, the settling defendant has the burden of proving a set-
tlement has been made. The non-settling defendant has the
burden of proving the settlement lacked good faith.60
This precise procedure was followed in Cario Systems v. Supe-
rior Court.61 There, the non-settling defendant hospital had
filed a cross-claim for contribution against the settling de-
fendant machine distributor prior to the settlement. Immedi-
ately after settlement, the distributor amended its answer to
the cross-claim to include as an affirmative defense its good
faith settlement with plaintiff. The court granted an immedi-
ate hearing on the good faith issue where it allowed testimony
from the various affected parties to be submitted as offers of
proof.
As mentioned earlier, no court has been willing to conduct
a mini-trial on the good faith issue, and without such a fo-
Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
SId.
122 Cal. App. 3d 1880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
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rum, it will not be possible for a court to determine with any
accuracy whether a settlement amount fairly reflects the rela-
tive liability of the settling party. However, some courts are
now willing to accept affidavits, copies of deposition tran-
scripts, and even jury verdict reporters to assist in determin-
ing the likely range of plaintiff's damages.62 Courts which
utilize a "price" test in determining whether a settlement has
been made in good faith and which accept a full range of
evidence to ascertain the likely percentage of culpability of
the settling defendant and the range of plaintiff's damages
provide the most effective remedy to non-settling defendants
for the equity lost because of joint and several liability and
extinguished rights of contribution.
V. CONCLUSION
The principle that damages should be apportioned equita-
bly has been subverted by the principle that a plaintiff should
be made whole for its damages, regardless of who pays, and
by the principle that settlements should be encouraged, even
at the cost of a fair allocation of plaintiff's loss. The present
arsenal of legal devices whose purpose it is to lessen the poten-
tial for inequitable apportionment of damages, including the
right of contribution and its progeny, have fallen short of this
goal. The shortfall has been primarily due to the use of stan-
dards which are impossible to define and difficult to apply.
In spite of the shortcomings in the present system of dam-
age apportionment, it is nevertheless important for all per-
sons connected with the aviation litigation field to be aware
of the variances in the respective state laws so that the inter-
ests of the parties affected by the various rules, statutes and
case law can be best served.
62 See Owen, 713 F.2d 1461.
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